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Ontological Foundations of
Conceptual Modelling
Reconsidered: A Response
Boris Wyssusek
Queensland University of Technology
b.wyssusek@qut.edu.au
Abstract. In their quest for theoretical foundations of conceptual modelling
information systems researchers have turned to various disciplines for inspiration. However, the adaptation of theories, concepts, and vernaculars across
disciplines has always proven to be difficult at least. In the debate paper “On
Ontological Foundations of Conceptual Modelling” I have subjected the transposition of Mario Bunge’s ontology to an ontology for conceptual modelling
(i.e., the so-called Bunge-Wand-Weber (BWW) ontology) to a critique. Six
commentaries to the critique have been received. They are reviewed—not
with the intention of a closing argument but rather with the intent to structure
the debate, to clarify some misconceptions, and last but not least to encourage the curious reader to carry on with the debate beyond the scope of this
issue of the SJIS.
Key words: conceptual modelling, ontology, Bunge-Wand-Weber ontology.

1 Recollection
The argument in the debate paper “On ontological foundations of conceptual
modelling” (this issue, pp. 63-80) runs along the following lines:
Conceptual modelling is generally acknowledged as one of the most fundamental means in information systems development. The importance attributed
© Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 2006, 18(1):139-152
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to conceptual modelling continues to encourage the development of Yet
Another Modelling Approach (YAMA) while some keep asking for Not
Another Modelling Approach (NAMA) not grounded in scientific theory. In
response, researchers join in a quest for theoretical foundations of conceptual
modelling. Venturing into various disciplines for inspiration they return with
foundational theories of conceptual modelling rooted in different theoretical
domains. Currently, it appears ontological theories are favoured since—for
many—ontology still holds the promise of foundational knowledge about the
world. In 1986 Yair Wand and Ron Weber commenced work on an ontological
foundation for conceptual modelling. Having based their work on the ontology
of Mario Bunge, it became known as Bunge-Wand-Weber (BWW) ontology.
Wand and Weber understand (a) information systems as representations of
users’ perceptions of the real world and (b) information systems development
as a transformation of these perceptions to an artefact representing these perceptions. Based on these assumptions, Wand and Weber claim that Bunge’s
ontology provides an appropriate theoretical foundation for conceptual modelling and information systems – as this ontology: (a) is concerned with the representation of the real world; (b) uses terminology and concepts relevant to
information systems; (c) is to a large extent formalized; (d) provides formalisms and notations that can be re-used; (e) appears to be mature; and (f) provided Wand and Weber with insights when applied in different settings.
However, claims regarding the validity of the BWW ontology had not been
critically evaluated so far. It was thus the aim of my debate paper to contribute
to such an evaluation, by subjecting the transposition of Bunge’s ontology to
the BWW ontology to a critique.
In my critique I have argued that the transposition does not warrant the
claim that conceptual modelling and information systems—as understood by
Wand and Weber—can be theoretically grounded in Bunge’s ontology. My
argument is based on an analysis of certain parts of the transposition, showing
how crucial elements of Bunge’s ontology were either dropped, ignored or
modified to such an extent, that reference to Bunge’s work in support of the
validity of the BWW ontology is hardly justified. By briefly describing the
consequences of the alterations I have shown that these alterations are not
accidental but necessary, since without them it would be impossible to establish a connection between Bunge’s ontology and the theoretical foundations of
conceptual modelling and information systems in Wand and Weber’s sense.
Based on my understanding of conceptual modelling as being concerned with
the representation of conceptual knowledge and my conviction that language
is not ontologically committed (otherwise it would be a theory), I have generalised my findings and claimed that ontological foundations of conceptual
modelling are impossible in principle—unless we understand “ontological
140 • B. Wyssusek
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foundations” as dogmatic decrees. I concluded the debate paper with the invitation to reflect on the presuppositions underlying not only ontological but all
knowledge claims—in the tradition of Kantian Critique.
It was during his sabbatical in 2005 that Karlheinz Kautz paid Queensland
University of Technology a visit, providing me with the chance to converse
with him about research I had conducted—partly with Helmut Klaus—while I
was a member of a research team headed by Ron Weber. Having checked
Karl’s more recent publications before our meeting, I was not surprised by his
critical attitude towards our work on the determination of fit between organisational requirements and enterprise systems capabilities on the basis of the
BWW ontology. I was, however, surprised by his familiarity with issues I had
encountered while working with the BWW ontology. It turned out that his
familiarity was partly due to a presentation by Ron Weber and a subsequent
discussion of BWW ontology-related ideas at the IRIS conference in 2003.
While presuppositions underlying the BWW have not yet been questioned in
the literature, they obviously were at this Scandinavian conference. I am
greatly indebted to Karl not only for offering me the opportunity to present
some of my (and Helmut’s) ideas to the readers of the SJIS, but also for successfully soliciting critical and inspiring feedback from nine prominent information systems researchers. Karl’s offer to write this response has, however,
left me with an ambivalent feeling. On the one hand, I welcome the opportunity to respond to my critics, to structure the debate, and to clarify some misconceptions. On the other hand, it gives me the burden of having the final say.
I can only ensure the reader that the latter is not my intention: It shall be the
final say just for technical reasons, but the debate should be carried on beyond
this issue of the SJIS.
In part, the contributions of my critics go far beyond the scope of my
debate paper. It is thus impossible to address every single issue raised. In the
following summary and response I focus on issues I believe to be the most
crucial ones. As mentioned above, the goal of this exercise is not to provide a
final answer but to highlight some salient features of those issues under
debate.
I am grateful to Andreas Opdahl, Ed Kazmierczak, Giancarlo Guizzardi,
John Krogstie, Kalle Lyytinen, Karlheinz Kautz, Nicola Guarino, Ron Weber,
Simon Milton, and Yair Wand for their contributions to this debate.

B. Wyssusek • 141

Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2006

3

SJIS 18(1).book Page 142 Friday, October 6, 2006 9:24 AM

Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 18 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 8

2 Critique
In the conclusion of my debate paper (this issue, p. 74) I referred to a paper by
Klein and Lyytinen (1985) in which they described the lack of reflexivity in
scientism and the ensuing consequences for information systems research conducted in the spirit of this paradigm. Lack of reflexivity basically means the
inability to question the presuppositions underlying one’s mode of inquiry and
knowledge claims. In what became known as the Copernican Turn in philosophy, Kant first subjected popular assertions regarding the conditions of the
possibility of knowledge to a critique, which eventually revealed presuppositions that were void. No longer bound by these presuppositions he was able to
inverse traditional belief by famously denying “that all our knowledge must
conform to objects” and suggesting instead “that objects must conform to our
knowledge” (Kant 1784/2003, Bxvi).
Most of my critics recognised the Kantian spirit in my critical evaluation of
claims for the validity of the BWW ontology as a theoretical foundation of
conceptual modelling. They replied in the same spirit when they questioned
the foundations on which I based my argument. However, for Opdahl as well
as Wand and Weber the Kantian spirit of my critique was not evident. The latter rightfully suspected: “Perhaps […] Wyssusek has […] a particular notion
of ‘critical evaluation’ that we fail to understand. For our part, we have followed a time-honored tradition in science—namely, that the validity of theories needs to be tested empirically” (Wand and Weber, this issue, p. 128). This
had obvious consequences for the debate: By not recognising the critical
method Opdahl, Wand, and Weber could hardly address the critique. They reiterated their claims for the validity of the BWW ontology and sought to substantiate these claims with references to “critical evaluations”, meaning
empirical studies and reflections on the application of the BWW ontology
(e.g., Opdahl, this issue, pp. 96–98). Ultimately, Opdahl, Wand, and Weber
resorted to a pragmatist notion of truth, according to which the validity of a
theory is determined by its usefulness. Probably the gravest consequence of
their position might be the refutation of (the need for) earnest philosophical
considerations (Opdahl, this issue, p. 98; Wand and Weber, this issue, p. 129),
which is not only at odds with the very idea of developing ontological foundations for conceptual modelling. It also renders void every reference to the
‘authority’ of philosophy in general and its branch ontology in particular.
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3 Ontology and Ontologies
From Gruber’s (1993) non-philosophical definition of ontology as a specification of a conceptualisation, to common-sense ontology, to the full-fledged
doctrinal materialist ontology of Bunge, to formal ontology in the tradition of
Husserl, to the denial of ontology by the logical positivists, to social and radical constructivism—there are many notions of ontology to choose from.
Supported by Lyytinen’s and Krogstie’s linguistic and semiotic considerations, Guarino and Guizzardi as well as Milton and Kazmierczak (all this
issue) stress the need for ontological pluralism. This stance, however, has significant consequences for the general understanding of ontology. Far from
being a true representation of what exists in the world in the most general
terms, ontology becomes subject to pragmatic whims. An illustration: Modelling a “fairy information system” true to the BWW ontology would pose serious problems (see also Krogstie, this issue): Since fairies are fictions they
cannot be modelled as things with properties. According to Bunge (1981, p.
30), fictions, ideas, and concepts are brain processes or classes thereof. Brain
processes, however, are real and can thus be modelled as changes in the state
of things, i.e., of brains. Pragmatically, setting up a “fairy ontology” on which
to base the model of the fairy information system seems to be a more reasonable way to go. Such an opportunistic approach, however, can only be based on
ontologies in Gruber’s (1993) sense. As conceptual modellers we should leave
it to our clients to believe in the reality of fairies or not. The ontological commitment is beyond representations: see below.
For me, the most intriguing and convincing argument regarding ontological
pluralism comes from Lyytinen (this issue, p. 82): He likens the programme of
Wand and Weber to the programme of the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. In other words, he likens the quest for a universal ontology to the quest for
a universal language in which every fact can be described (e.g., Carnap 1931,
p. 437). The programme of logical positivism ultimately failed, but not without producing valuable insights. Lyytinen suggests that Wand and Weber’s
programme will likewise also eventually fail. The dream of the one universally valid representational scheme such as Leibniz’ mathesis universalis will
remain a dream (e.g., Eco 1995). Probably alluding to Popper’s characterisation of scientific progress as being possible only through conjecture and refutation, Lyytinen claims that the execution of Wand and Weber’s programme,
as well as the considerations and debates triggered by it, contribute to our
understanding of ontology and conceptual modelling. I cannot agree more.

B. Wyssusek • 143

Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2006

5

SJIS 18(1).book Page 144 Friday, October 6, 2006 9:24 AM

Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 18 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 8

4 Ontological Commitment
Closely connected to questions regarding our understanding of ontology are
questions regarding ontological commitment. For BUNGE, ontological commitment is semantic commitment (or semantic assumptions). While the ontology is just a conceptual model consisting of ontological and other concepts, it
is the ontological/semantic commitment that gives factual meaning to the
ontological concepts. The ontological/semantic commitment basically determines the referents of the ontological concepts. It is here that the distinction
between, e.g., realism and phenomenalism manifests itself (e.g., Bunge 1974,
pp. 70–75, 108–111). On the basis of this understanding of ontological commitment conceptual models are not per se ontologically committed. Conceptual models can thus be understood as formalisms that allow various
ontological/semantic interpretations (Bunge 1974, pp. 108–109).
Guarino and Guizzardi (this issue, p. 117), the proponents of formal ontology in the debate, seem to build on this separation of concerns when they write
that “formal ontology is completely neutral for what concerns its domain of
application”. However, subsequently they explain that “choices between alternative representation structures can only be justified on ontological grounds”,
implying that some representation structures are per se ontologically committed. I cannot agree with this argument, since I believe that the “separation of
concerns” addressed above should be applied consistently. I agree, however,
that ontological interpretations of alternative representation structures may
lead to the insight that under a given ontological interpretation the meanings
of the alternative representation structures turn out not to be identical.
For Opdahl, Wand, and Weber, the issue of ontological commitment seems
to be of different concern. While both parties claim to be ontological realists
(Opdahl, this issue, p. 100; Wand and Weber, this issue, p. 129), the latter
seem to commit themselves also to (social) constructivist views: “[B]y adopting Bunge’s concepts, we have acquired a socially constructed reality that has
utility for us” (Wand and Weber, this issue, p. 131). Such a statement is not
compatible with Bunge’s materialist ontology and critical-realist epistemology: “Constructivists systematically confuse reality with our representations
of it: the explored with the explorer, facts with data, objective laws with law
statements, assumptions with conventions. This is certainly not the way scientists proceed” (Bunge 1993, p. 215). “The idealist who does not distinguish a
thing from any of its models cannot account for the multiplicity of schemata of
one and the same thing” (Bunge 1977, p. 121). See also Opdahl (this issue, pp.
98–99) on this matter.
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While Wand and Weber are certainly right when they claim that “name
calling” is rather meaningless with respect to the implications of ontological
assumptions, my critique regarding their lack of commitment to Bunge’s dialectical materialism was certainly not a request for “name calling”. Wand,
Weber, Opdahl, Milton, and Kazmierczak (all this issue) are all committed to
ontological realism. Such a commitment is, however, not sufficient when
referring to Bunge’s ontology in support of the validity of the BWW ontology.
As a realist I can believe in the existence of unicorns, fairies, ideas, and concepts. Yet Bunge is not only realist but also materialist and thus denies the
reality of concepts. Hence, if we try to create conceptual models true to
Bunge’s ontology, we cannot model “concepts” because “concepts” do not
exist according to Bunge’s realist and materialist ontology. Obviously, there is
more to “dialectical materialism” than just being a name (see also section
“Bunge, Dialectical Materialism, Name-Calling”, p. 147).
The main thrust of my critique is concerned with issues that arise if an
adaptation of a theory is performed narrowly in scope and selectively. It does
not lead to the conclusion that such an approach is invalid in principle. However, it does lead to the conclusion that claims for the validity of the resultant
theory cannot be based on the validity of the adapted theory—if salient features of this theory got lost or were substantially altered during transposition.

5 Conceptual Modelling
Milton and Kazmierczak (this issue, p. 88), referring to Smith (2004), argue
that conceptual modelling is not about modelling conceptual knowledge but
about modelling reality. They regard “conceptual modelling” as a misnomer.
This idea is clearly in opposition to the genealogy of conceptual modelling I
have provided in the debate paper. Given the responses it is evident that my
genealogy suggests a universal consensus regarding the meaning of “conceptual modelling”—which is not the case. Not only Milton and Kazmierczak but
also Guarino and Guizzardi, Opdahl, Wand and Weber (all this issue) stress
that conceptual modelling ultimately is about modelling reality. Even if I can
see their point by considering conceptual knowledge as some sort of mediator
between reality and conceptual models, I am not convinced about the validity
of this limitation of the scope of conceptual modelling. However, I understand
that this view is necessary for the justification of the relevance of ontologies
such as Bunge’s for the theoretical foundation of conceptual modelling.
The reasoning behind my objection to this view is as follows: From a pragmatic point of view, conceptual modellers frequently work with clients who
B. Wyssusek • 145
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are seldom familiar with ontology. Hence, those clients are not likely to provide the conceptual modeller with ontologically sound conceptualisations of
reality. I cannot imagine a fruitful dialogue between a client and a conceptual
modeller in which the latter argues that the client cannot have a fairy information system because fairies are not real and that s/he rather should get a brain
processes information system (I am drawing on Bunge here). From a theoretical point of view, conceptual models are representations. Representations can
generally be understood as signs, i.e., as something that stands for something
else, to someone in some capacity (see also Krogstie, this issue). Thus, limiting conceptual modelling to the representation of reality is an unnecessary
constraint. Referring back to the sections on ontology and ontological commitment, conceptual modelling is about creating representational structures that
are open to ontological interpretations. This understanding does not preclude
the creation of conceptual models with reference to some ontology. However,
the ontology will remain outside the representational structure and needs to be
read into this structure whenever necessary.

6 Ontological Foundations of Conceptual
Modelling
What are ontological foundations of conceptual modelling? What does it mean
to ground conceptual modelling in ontology?
Based on the debate contributions, the question most fundamental to every
effort towards the development of ontological foundations of conceptual modelling cannot be answered unanimously. For Opdahl, Wand, and Weber, ontology not only provides fundamental knowledge about reality; it is also a source
of a minimal set of constructs that need to be denotable by the ultimate conceptual modelling language in order to be able to represent reality. Milton and
Kazmirczak’s response exhibits a similar understanding, yet they do not
believe in the absoluteness of a single ontology. It seems that all of the aforementioned authors assume conceptual modelling languages to be ontologically committed. In Guarino and Guizzardi’s response I recognise—rightly or
wrongly—a separation of concerns, even if not consistently applied: Ontology
is about reality in general; conceptual modelling is about modelling conceptual knowledge which is about reality and fictions. Conclusively, the ontological foundation is not concerned with conceptual modelling but with
conceptual knowledge. Presupposing the separation of concerns, for Lyytinen,
Krogstie, and myself the question of ontological foundations of conceptual
modelling does not arise. Grounding conceptual knowledge in ontology is
146 • B. Wyssusek
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acknowledged to be an important issue—however, not for conceptual modellers. Returning to Wand and Weber’s (1988) original motivation, the conceptual modeller’s concern should be the creation of an adequate representation of
conceptual knowledge—whatever is considered adequate under each given set
of circumstances. Pace my critics but, if the conceptual modeller goes beyond
this concern, I believe s/he is leaving the domain of conceptual modelling.

7 Some Short Replies & Clarifications
7.1 Bunge, Dialectical Materialism, Name-Calling
Bunge wrote a substantial critique of dialectics and claimed occasionally that
his materialism is not dialectical but scientific (e.g., Bunge 1975). Despite
Bunge’s effort, Lyytinen, Krogstie, and I still have no issue with labelling
Bunge’s ontology “dialectical materialist”. Bunge himself did not completely
denounce dialectics in his ontology. He writes, admittedly somewhat cryptically: “This new ontology [i.e., scientific materialism] is dynamicist but not
dialectical. If preferred it keeps, elucidates and systematizes what is alive, but
discards what is dead, in dialectics” (Bunge 1981, p. 62, my emphasis).

7.2 Opdahl
(pp. 98–99) Opdahl claims that Gruber’s (1993) definition of ontology as
“specification of a conceptualisation” is not necessarily in conflict with
Bunge’s understanding of ontology. First, Gruber (1993) claims that his definition provides the word “ontology” with “certainly a different sense of the
word than its use in philosophy”. Second, Bunge’s ontology is (ideally) a theory, i.e., “hypothetical-deductive system […]. In particular, an ontological theory is a theory that contains and interrelates ontological categories, or generic
concepts representing components or features of the world” (Bunge 1977, p.
11). While ontological commitment according to Gruber commits the user of
an ontology to the use of a certain vocabulary, ontological commitment
according to Bunge commits the user to assume the existence of what the
ontological concepts refer to.
(p. 99) Opdahl states that I have misquoted him and Brian Henderson-Sellers. I am sorry for that.
(p. 99) Opdahl claims that it will eventually be possible to model “social
constructs and mental concepts” on the basis of the BWW ontology. Since
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concepts are fictions, my comments on the modelling of concepts and fairies
(see sections 3 and 4, pp. 143–146) apply.
(p. 101 and note 7) Opdahl claims that Bunge’s semantics is not relevant
for conceptual modelling since it is “semantics […] of science and therefore
not obviously relevant for conceptual modeling”. In note 7 Opdahl admits that
Bunge’s ontology is also scientific. He tries to resolve this obvious contradiction by a line of reasoning which I fail to comprehend.

7.3 Guarino and Guizzardi
(p. 116) “… the author seems to fall in the same trap of Wand and Weber,
namely, he also approaches ontology as if Bunge’s ontology was the only
available scientific ontology.”: Here, Guarino and Guizzardi question the most
fundamental presupposition of my critique: the position from which it was
conducted. I cannot make excuses for having taken a position, since any critique requires a position. However, I can explain my choice of position:
Bunge’s philosophy is the sole philosophical source of the BWW ontology.
Had I chosen, for example, a phenomenological position, I would have had to
dismiss the entire project outright (exogenous criticism). Staying close to the
source allowed me to show contradictions (from) within the project (endogenous criticism). Guarino and Guizzardi’s critique and subsequent presentation of an alternative position and its consequences on the reasoning about
ontological foundations of conceptual modelling illustrate the need for reflexivity in critique.

7.4 Wand and Weber
(p. 129) “Wyssusek ascribes several fairly extreme positions to Bunge ...”:
This is not the case, since I have only paraphrased Bunge. He himself never
tried to be ‘political correct’ (e.g., Matthews 2003). But this was not the point
of my original remark. Rather I sought to highlight a conflict between his scientific approach in general and his occasional unscientific accusations levelled
against works not based on scientism. For example, he frequently targets
Heidegger, without having ever published a scientific analysis of Heidegger’s
work. Thus, Bunge’s accusations against Heidegger’s work are unsubstantiated and unscientific.
(p. 133) “Wyssusek seems to take umbrage with our having relied on
advice from our colleague, Mattessich …”: My point is that Bunge’s ontology
was not selected – in the literal meaning of the word. Drawing on H. A.
Simon’s popular model of a decision process, informed selection presupposes
148 • B. Wyssusek
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a problem statement (given), the design of or the search for solutions (not
given), the establishment of selection criteria (not given). As a consequence,
the ‘selection’ of Bunge’s ontology cannot be justified on rational grounds.
Additionally, the invitation to propose an alternative ontology which is “better” than the BWW ontology (p. 135) is of little avail, as long as no selection/
evaluation criteria are being provided (see also Lyytinen, this issue, p. 82,
Guarino and Guizzardi, this issue, p. 116).
(p. 134) “How we describe the world is surely a fundamental ontological
question.” This would only be the case if we follow Lyytinen (this issue, p. 82)
by considering representation and reality as co-constitutive. Yet such a consideration would not be consistent with Bunge’s ontology.

8 Conclusions
The development of theoretical foundations of conceptual modelling on the
basis of philosophical ontology poses major challenges. Some of those challenges have been addressed in my critique of Wand and Weber’s adaptation of
Mario Bunge’s ontology for the purpose of ontological grounding of conceptual modelling. I have argued that this transposition of Bunge’s ontology to an
ontology for conceptual modelling does not warrant the reference to Bunge’s
work in support of the validity of the resultant Bunge-Wand-Weber ontology.
My critique revealed that salient features of Bunge’s ontology got lost during
the transposition. I have further sought to illustrate that this loss was not accidental but necessary in order to establish a connection between theoretical
foundations of conceptual modelling and Bunge’s ontology. Finally, based on
the belief that language is not ontologically committed (otherwise it would be
a theory) I have questioned the plausibility of the project of ontological foundations of conceptual modelling in general.
The responses to my critique can be grouped with respect to their methodological stance into “critics” and “apologists” (which is not a valuation). Both
groups responded accordingly. Even if methodological considerations were
not at the centre of the debate, they had significant consequences on its content
and structure. The debate clearly shows that the issues raised in my critique
and in the responses are genuine and indeed debatable, i.e., there is no glib
answer. It also shows that my critique is of limited scope and needs to be
expanded, especially with respect to alternative notions of ontology and the
relation between language and ontology. As expected, the plausibility of the
project of ontological foundations of conceptual modelling in general cannot
be determined easily once and for all—and critique needs to be reflexive.
B. Wyssusek • 149
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Extrapolating the history of metaphysical thought, information systems
researchers are likely to debate on the possibility and form of ontological
foundations of conceptual modelling for many years to come.
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